Three Recent Royal Commissions: The Failure to Prevent Harms and




THREE RECENT ROYAL COMMISSIONS:  
THE FAILURE TO PREVENT HARMS AND ATTRIBUTIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL LIABILITY 
 
Penny Crofts 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is increasing international recognition of the widespread harms caused by large 
organisations and the seeming absence of attributions of criminal liability to those 
organisations. Recent Australian Royal Commissions have shown long-term systemic harms 
and crimes inflicted within and by large organisations and yet the criminal law’s account of 
responsibility within and of corporations remains insipid. Criminal legal doctrine has failed 
to develop a coherent, persuasive and pragmatic means of attributing culpability for harms 
caused by these large organisations. This criminal justice system failure is due to a failure to 
conceive of corporations as responsible in and of themselves. To address the weakness of 
the criminal legal response, this article focuses on recent reforms by the United Kingdom 
and proposed reforms in Australia to develop a form of omissions liability by criminalising 
the organisational failure to prevent. The UK model focuses on a specific predicate offence 
(such as bribery), but this article argues that the predicate offence can and should be 
extended more broadly to systemic failure to prevent breach of duty of care. To this end, 
this article considers the findings of three different Australian Royal Commissions to argue 
how and why the failure to prevent can be sufficiently blameworthy to justify and require 
the attribution of criminal liability and sanctions. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Criminologists have long pointed to the financial and physical harms caused by large 
organisations and the relative dearth of attributions of criminal liability to those 
organisations.1 Recent Australian Royal Commissions have shown long-term systemic harms 
and crimes inflicted within and by large organisations.2 Despite widespread condemnation 
                                                          
1 Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Dryden, 1949); Cedric Michel, John Cochran and Kathleen Heide, 
‘Public Knowledge about White-Collar Crime: An Exploratory Study’ (2016) 65(3) Crime, Law and Social Change 
67-91; Steve Tombs and David Whyte, The Corporate Criminal: Why Corporations Must Be Abolished (Taylor 
and Francis, 2015). Mihailis Diamantis, ‘Functional Corporate Knowledge’ (2019) 61(2) William and Mary Law 
Review 319-396, 324. 
2 This article focuses on a broad range of harms caused by large organisations including child sexual abuse, 
elder abuse and financial crimes. There is some ambiguity about whether or not some of the organisational 
harms such as elder abuse and financial malfeasance are necessarily criminal, reflecting and reinforcing the 
absence of prosecution in this area.  
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of these organisations and the harms that they have inflicted, a criminal legal response to 
organisational failures has been largely absent.3 It is only since the Royal Commission into 
Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (‘Banking Royal 
Commission’) that regulators have shown greater willingness to pursue criminal actions 
against banking organisations.4 Although the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses 
to Child Sexual Abuse was tasked with investigating institutional responses, no reforms were 
suggested for the prosecution of institutional failings,5 and there has been no criminal legal 
response to organisational failures to protect and prevent the abuse of children. Similarly, 
despite a scathing assessment by the Royal Commission into Aged Care in its Interim Report: 
Neglect of the quality of care provided to older people, there was no consideration of the 
role of the legal system in aged care.6 This absence of a structural criminal legal response 
reflects academic literature which has long pointed to the disjunction between social and 
moral denunciation of organisational malfeasance and the ostensible criminal legal impunity 
of these organisations.7  
 
The absence of any criminal legal response to organisational malfeasance is in accordance 
with long-term academic recognition about problems the criminal justice system has in 
conceptualising and imposing corporate responsibility.8 The findings of the Royal 
                                                          
3 To avoid legal technicalities of the definition of the ‘corporation’ and also in recognition of the culpability of 
organisations which are not by definition corporations, this article refers to ‘organisations’ throughout to 
include not only legal ‘corporations’ but also institutions in constructions of organisational criminal liability. 
4 ASIC has signalled a willingness to prosecute for corporate malfeasance post Banking Royal Commission but 
has not as yet met with success.  
5 Penny Crofts, ‘Legal Irresponsibility and Institutional Responses to Child Sex Abuse’ (2016) 34(2) Law in 
Context 79-99. 
6 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, Interim Report: Neglect (2019) (‘The 
Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality’); Joseph Ibrahim and David Ranson, ‘Neglect in Aged Care - A Role 
for The Justice System?’ (2019) 27(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 254-258, 254. 
7 See, eg, John HC Colvin and James Argent, ‘Corporate and Personal Liability for “Culture” in Corporations?’ 
(2016) 34(1) Company and Securities Law Journal 30-47. See also Michel et al (n 1). Michel et al have argued 
that the public lack (accurate) knowledge of white-collar crime and criminal legal responses. Widespread 
media reporting of Royal Commissions contribute to public knowledge about the extent of harms caused by 
large organisations and the lack of a criminal legal response. 
8 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, ‘The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, 
Collectivism and Accountability’ (1988) 11(3) Sydney Law Review 468-513; Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, 
Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gregory Gilchrist, ‘The Expressive 
Cost of Corporate Immunity’ (2012) 64(1) Hastings Law Journal 1-56; Neil Gunningham, ‘Negotiated Non-
Compliance: A Case Study of Regulatory Failure’ (1987) 9(1) Law and Policy 69-95; Celia Wells, Corporations 
and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2002); Jonathon Clough, ‘Bridging the Theoretical Gap: 
The Search for a Realist Model of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2007) 18(3) Criminal Law Forum 267-300; Eli 
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Commissions have given stark insight into Veitch’s argument about the legally structured 
irresponsibility of organisations – the larger an organisation, the more capable it is of 
causing systemic harms, and yet the less likely it is to be held criminally liable.9 Criminal legal 
doctrine has failed to develop a coherent, persuasive and effective means of attributing 
responsibility for harms caused by large organisations at a time when large organisations 
are becoming increasingly dominant and we are increasingly dependent upon them.10 The 
Royal Commissions have repeatedly shown large organisations causing widespread, on-
going, systemic harms and a failure of the criminal justice system to adequately respond, 
demonstrating the acute need to construct a persuasive and pragmatic account of corporate 
liability. This article focuses on a response by the UK to develop a form of omissions liability 
by criminalising the failure to prevent. Under the UK model, the offence occurs if the 
organisation fails to prevent a bribery or tax evasion offence by an employee and cannot 
show it had in place adequate procedures to prevent the bribery. That is, the UK model 
requires a specific predicate offence (of bribery or tax evasion) as the foundation for 
organisational culpability. An offence modelled on the UK bribery offence was introduced 
into the Australian Senate in December 2019 under the Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2019 (‘CLACCC Bill 2019)’.11 This article extends the UK 
model of failure to prevent and argues that instead of requiring proof of a specific predicate 
offence, an organisation can and should be liable for the systemic failure to prevent breach 
of legal duty of care. To this end, this article considers the findings of three different 
Australian Royal Commissions to argue how and why the failure to prevent can be 
sufficiently blameworthy to justify and require the imposition of criminal sanctions. This is 
partly based on the pragmatic recognition, voiced by Fisse in relation to corporate criminal 
law reform, that ‘criminal liability based on blameworthiness is more likely to induce respect 
                                                          
Lederman, ‘Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation towards 
Aggregration and the Search for Self-Identity’ (2000) 4(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 642-708. 
9 Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (Routledge, 2007). 
10 Celia Wells, ‘Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in the United Kingdom’ in Stefano 
Manacorda, Gabrio Forti and Francesco Centonze (eds), Preventing Corporate Corruption: The Anti Bribery 
Compliance Model (Springer, 2014) 505. 
11 The proposed amendments under the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 
2019 (Cth) (‘CLACCC Bill 2019’) are broadly similar to those proposed under the CLACCC Bill 2017 which lapsed 
in 2019.A major difference between the UK bribery offence and the proposed Australian offence, is that the 
Australian offence draws the liability net more widely that the UK offence, with a broader definition of 
‘associate’ of the company. Mark Lewis, ‘Criminalising Corporate Failures to Prevent: Foreign Bribery by Non-
Controlled Associates - A Net Cast Too Wide’ (2020) 44 Criminal Law Journal 80, 83-85. 
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for the law and willingness to comply’,12 and by extension, for regulators to investigate, 
prosecute and enforce. There is also a normative argument that criminal law requires 
culpability. It is a distinctively moralised institution that expresses right and wrong, backed 
by governmental sanctions.13 This is in accordance with an expressive account of criminal 
law, whereby state actions communicate values about what society values and condemns.14 
On this account, the failure of the criminal justice system to prosecute organisations for 
systemic harms communicates that these harms are just a cost, albeit unfortunate, of doing 
business.  
 
The three Royal Commissions considered in this article analysed very different industries. 
The terms of reference for each Royal Commission include a requirement to consider 
systemic issues and responses to any findings of systemic failings. The Royal Commission 
into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (‘Royal Commission into Child Abuse’) 
commenced in 2013 and continued until the end of 2017.15 It detailed serious long-term 
systemic failures to prevent and adequately respond to child sexual abuse by many different 
types of institutions that have contact with children. The Banking Royal Commission 
commenced in December 2017 and the final report of Commissioner Kenneth Madison 
Hayne was submitted in February 2019.16 The terms of reference included investigation of 
conduct, practices, behaviour or business activities by financial services which might have 
amounted to misconduct or fallen below community standards and expectations. The 
Commission was also tasked with investigating the adequacy of existing laws and policies of 
the Commonwealth, internal systems and forms of industry self-regulation and regulators to 
identify, regulate and address misconduct and to meet community standards.17 The Banking 
                                                          
12 Brent Fisse, ‘Penal Designs and Corporate Conduct: Test Results from Fault and Sanctions in Australian Cartel 
Law’ (2019) 40(1) Adelaide Law Review 285-300, 287. 
13 Robert W. Thomas, ‘Making Sense of Corporate Criminals: A Tentative Taxonomy’ (2019) 17(SI) Georgetown 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 775-794, 792-793. 
14 Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, ‘Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement’ (2000) 148(5) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1503-1575; Mihailis E Diamantis, ‘Corporate Criminal Minds’ (2016) 
91(5) Notre Dame Law Review 2049-2090, 2062. 
15 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Royal Commission into Institutional Responses into Institutional 
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Report, (December 2017). (‘Royal Commission into Child Abuse’). 
16 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation, and Financial Services 
Industry (‘Banking Royal Commission’), Final Report (2019). 
17 Royal Commission, ‘Signed Patent Letters,’ Royal Commission into the Banking, Superannuation and 




Royal Commission found widespread evidence of criminality and malfeasance.18 The Royal 
Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (‘The Royal Commission into Aged Care 
Quality’) was established in October 2018 and is due to provide a final report by November 
2020. The Terms of Reference of the Aged Care Royal Commission include an inquiry into 
the quality of aged care services, the extent of substandard care being provided, ‘the causes 
of any systemic failures, and any actions that should be taken in response’.19 The Aged Care 
Royal Commission has published an interim report in October entitled Neglect.20  
 
The idea of combining the findings of these three different Royal Commissions for the 
purposes of analysis is unusual. Corporate law reform and scholarship frequently focus on 
discrete areas. For example, the Child Sexual Abuse and Banking Royal Commissions have 
proposed reforms specific to their topic areas. The recent ALRC corporate law reform 
project is primarily focused on financial crimes, as shown by the Commissions and Inquiries 
to which it refers, the examples of offences and the proposed law reform.21 Likewise, 
although the proposed CLACCC Bill 2019 (Cth) is aimed at ‘combatting corporate crime’ its 
target is financial crimes. Many physical harms are primarily considered through the lens of 
health and safety law,22 whilst environmental harms form their own niche.23 There are 
difficulties in combining these disparate areas, particularly the risk of trivialising harms 
through superficial analysis by attempting to cover too much ground. However, this 
approach is highly original and has the advantage of avoiding piecemeal reforms and instead 
focuses on a commonality that links organisations operating across the spectrum, that is, 
harms caused by organisational breach of legal duty. It contributes to the conceptualisation 
of corporations as legal agents that can and should be held responsible for harms caused. 
 
                                                          
18 Banking Royal Commission (n 18)  
19 https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/Terms-of-reference.aspx. 
20 Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality (n6). 
21 Australian Law Reform Commission, Corporate Criminal Responsibility (Discussion Paper No 87, 2019) 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/discussion-paper-87/>. 
22 Work safety is regulated by Commonwealth and state legislation such as the Work Health and Safety Act 
2011 (Cth). Many health and safety offences have a similar structure to the proposed failure to prevent a 
breach of duty offence. For example, under section 32 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) an 
organisation can be charged with a category two offence for ‘failure to comply with a health and safety duty’. 
23 The Commonwealth's key environmental legislation is the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). 
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All three Royal Commissions emphasise the long-term, systemic harms caused by 
organisations across time. Each Royal Commission provided reports or pointed to the sheer 
number of inquiries which have previously unearthed and reported harms caused in the 
same areas and yet the same harms have continued to be inflicted in the same areas.24 
Despite arousing horror and calls of “never again” each Royal Commission has summarised a 
series of inquiries into the abuse of children in institutions and the failings of the aged care 
sector.25 These Royal Commissions are simply the most recent in a series of governmental 
and non-governmental inquiries into organisational failures. All three Royal Commissions 
show a historic failure by regulators and the criminal justice system to adequately protect 
against, and respond to, harms or offences in and by organisations. The harms have also 
occurred against a backdrop of weak, underfunded, overworked regulators – which in turn 
has led to a lack of criminal prosecution at the peak of the regulatory pyramid.26 
 
This article draws upon the reports and findings of these Royal Commissions to show that 
systemic failures of institutions to protect against, and respond adequately to, harms or 
offences in institutions are culpable and egregious failures in their own right that are worthy 
of criminal sanctions. It is not a matter of chance that offenders are able to perpetrate 
crimes many times over many years in specific institutions – they are enabled, or at least not 
prevented, by the systems, policies and reactions of that specific institution. These 
institutions can be described as criminogenic – they cause or are likely to cause criminal 
behaviour, by encouraging, tolerating or turning a blind eye to criminal behaviour. 
Accordingly, the findings of the Royal Commissions demonstrate the urgent need for an 
extension of models of responsibility beyond those of individual perpetrators to consider 
                                                          
24 See, eg, Shurlee Swain, History of Australian inquiries reviewing institutions providing care for children (, 
Autralian Catholic University, October 2014). The United Kingdom is currently undertaking an Independent 
Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. (see https://www.iicsa.org.uk/). For a summary of aged care inquiries see 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health, Aged Care and Sport, Parliament of Australia, Report 
on the Inquiry into the Quality of Care in Residential Aged Care Facilities in Australia (October 2018), Chapter 
One. (‘Report on the Inquiry Residential Aged Care Facilities.’) 
25 Above (n26) Report on the Inquiry Residential Aged Care Facilities. See also Rory Haupt, ‘The Royal 
Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety: A Quick Guide,’ Parliament of Australia (Webpage, 2019) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1
920/Quick_Guides/RoyalCommissionAgedCare>.  
26 Fisse and Braithwaite (n 8). It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the shortcomings of the 
regulators in this area, but the cultures of the regulators are key as is a failure to unite the different sectors 
and consider corporate wrongdoing as a whole.   
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the responsibility of the criminogenic organisation itself in inflicting and sustaining crimes. 
These Royal Commissions, like other public inquiries, encourage and require reflection upon 
the unsatisfactory criminal legal response to organisational harms. This is particularly so 
because particular events provide a catalyst for corporate criminal law reform.27 The failure 
of the criminal justice system to respond to systemic failures of large organisations requires 
us to think imaginatively and broadly about organisational culpability. The absence of a 
general theory of corporate liability has long been recognised – the corporate law theorist 
Celia Wells has pointed to the lack of any ‘blueprint underpinning design’28 of corporate 
criminal liability. This article aims to contribute to a general theory of corporate liability that 
recognises corporations as specific legal subjects of the 21st century. In order to analyse the 
efficacy of this general approach, this article will explore two key themes throughout – first, 
the enforceability of the proposed failure to prevent offence (a pragmatic account) and 
second, whether or not the offence establishes the blameworthiness of the organisation (a 
normative account). This article draws upon philosophies of wickedness to argue that 
systemic failure can and should be regarded as sufficiently culpable to justify criminal 
sanctions. 
 
This paper will first outline contemporary models of corporate liability, that of nominalism 
and realism, to situate the UK failure to prevent offence. Section two will apply the 
requirement of a foundational offence in the UK failure to prevent offence to recent Royal 
Commission findings. Section three draws on Royal Commission findings to demonstrate the 
ways in which organisations are sites of specific risk and the failure to develop reasonable 
procedures to prevent breach of legal duty can be attributed to organisational or systemic 
failure. I conclude by arguing that the offence of failure to prevent satisfies both the 
practical and normative tests.  
 
II CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
Despite the lack of any general theory of corporate criminal liability, for the purposes of 
analysis it can be divided according to whether the corporation is viewed as a collective in 
                                                          
27 For example, Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 - A 10 Year 
Review’ (2018) 82(1) The Journal of Criminal Law 48-75, 48. 
28 Wells (n 10), 506. 
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name only (that is, nominalist) or whether the corporation is regarded as an autonomous 
legal agent (that is, realist). This section outlines the different models and associated legal 
doctrine in Australia as a way of contextualising the failure to prevent offence in the UK and 
the proposed failure to prevent bribery offence in the CLACCC Bill 2019 (Cth). 
 
A. Nominalist approaches to corporate liability 
The dominant model of corporate liability, nominalism, dates from the 19th century and 
privileges the classic criminal legal subject – the flesh and blood individual.29 On this 
account, corporations are artificial entities made up of nothing more than a collective of 
individuals and as such, can only act through living persons.30 This is a form of 
‘methodological individualism’ as it is based on the assumption that all social action can only 
be explained through the actions of individuals – that is, corporations do not commit crimes, 
people do.31 According to the nominalist account, it is farcical to suggest that corporations 
are capable of acting and/or having intentions except through the natural persons who 
constitute the corporate enterprise.32 To this end, various approaches have been adopted to 
attribute the actions and intentions of individuals to the corporation. One approach that the 
courts have adopted is the ascription of corporate responsibility for the actions of an 
employee through the concept of vicarious liability.33 Under this principle, a corporation can 
be liable for actions or omissions committed by an agent in the course of or during the 
scope of employment. In Australia and the UK there has been limited application of 
vicarious liability, compared with the USA.34  
 
                                                          
29 Max Radin, ‘The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality’ (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643-667.  
30 Eric Colvin, ‘Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability’ (1995) 6(1) Criminal Law Forum 1-44; Meir Dan-
Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations (Oxford University Press, 1986). Fatal robots are arguably a way in 
which corporations can act without humans. See,eg, S Solaiman, ‘Corporate Manslaughter by Industrial Robots 
at Work: Who Should Go on Trial under the Principle of Common Law in Australia’ (2016) 35(1) Journal of Law 
and Commerce 21-53. 
31 Fisse (n 14). Jennifer G Hill, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in Australia: An Evolving Corporate Governance 
Technique?’ [2003] Journal of Business Law 1-40. 
32 Amy J Sepinwall, ‘Corporate Moral Responsibility’ (2016) 11(1) Philosophy Compass 3-13, 3. 
33 R & Minister for Customs v Australasian Films Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 195.  
34 See New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co v United States 212 US 481 (1909). For an analysis of the 
problematic foundations of vicarious liability see the civil case of Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC 
[2016] HCA 37. Fisse has argued that Australia cartel law is a species of vicarious liability. See Fisse (n 14). For 
vicarious liability in the US see Lucian E Dervan, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability, Moral Culpability, and the Yates 
Memo’ (2016) 46(1) Stetson Law Review 111-126. 
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The dominant approach for ascribing corporate liability in Australia is through identification 
theory, which requires proof that the ‘directing mind’ of the corporation has acted with the 
requisite fault, expounded in Tesco v Nattrass [1972] AC 153.35 This approach is based on an 
anthropomorphic conception of the company, where only those persons invested by proper 
authority with managerial powers and responsibility are regarded as the head or brains of 
the company. The ‘state of mind’ of this ‘directing mind’ is treated by law as the state of 
mind of the organisation which enables criminal liability to be imposed on a corporation for 
offences that require mens rea. The principle requires that the prosecution prove that the 
directing mind of a corporation knew of the criminal actions and possessed the necessary 
mens rea.36  
 
Identification theory has not met with much practical success, to the extent that it has been 
labelled an ‘obstacle’ to corporate conviction.37 It is highly restrictive, artificial and fails to 
grapple with the reality of contemporary corporations.38 Specifically, the theory works 
better with small, owner managed companies but tends to insulate large corporations from 
criminal liability. The ‘directing mind’ model distorts decision-making in large corporations 
as it is difficult to determine who the directing mind is, and whether she is in command of 
what the organisation does.39 This is because modern corporations distribute authority in 
many ways which generate more than one directing mind and will. The identification 
principle specifies that only staff and officers who are very high up in the corporate 
hierarchy can represent the directing mind of the corporation. Such a person or people must 
                                                          
35 Hamilton v Whitehead 166 CLR 121, 127. The UK has largely reaffirmed the directing mind approach in AG’s 
Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] EWCA Crn 90. The test was tempered somewhat by the PC expanding the 
people whose actions and state of mind are attributed to the company in Meridian Global Funds Management 
Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 All ER 918.  
36 The directing mind can be more than one person acting collectively, such as a board of directors. See James 
Chalmers, ‘Corporate Culpable Homicide: Transco Plc v HM Advocate’ (2004) 8(2) Edinburgh Law Review 262-
266. For an analysis of the common law position see Olivia Dixon, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: The Influence 
of Corporate Culture’ in Justin O’Brien and George Gilligan (eds), Integrity, Risk and Accountability in Capital 
Markets: Regulating Culture (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
37 Solaiman (n 32), 51. 
38 Judicial criticisms include Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] 3 
All ER 918 (Lord Hoffman); Canadian Dredge & Dock Co v R [1985] 1 SCR 662, 693 (Justice Estey); Moulin Global 
Eyecare Trading Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2014) 17 HKCFAR 218, 67. See also, Stefan HC Lo, 
‘Context and Purpose in Corporate Attribution: Can the “directing Mind” Be Laid to Rest?’ (2017) 4(2) Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 349-376.  
39 Liz Campbell, ‘Corporate Liability and the Criminalization of Failure’ (2018) 12(2) Law and Financial Markets 
Review 57-70, 59. 
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be responsible for the supervision of corporate activities and the design of corporate 
policies at the highest level.40 Larger organisations are capable of inflicting greater systemic 
harms, and yet the larger an organisation is, the more difficult it is to establish the directing 
mind and that they had necessary mens rea.41  
 
Nominalist theories of corporate liability also fail to reflect organisational culpability. These 
approaches require proof of fault of a representative of the company, but they do not 
establish organisational fault, only that a particular representative was at fault.42 For 
example, identification theory fails to capture circumstances where there is no underlying 
individual fault but there is corporate culpability.43 Nominalist accounts focus on individuals’ 
actions or omissions and are unable to conceptualise organisational failure. For example, 
the Herald of Free Enterprise public court of inquiry found that there was a ‘disease of 
sloppiness’ at every level of the corporate hierarchy,44 but charges of corporate negligence 
against the directors and of corporate manslaughter against P&O failed because no one 
individual was negligent.45  
 
Nominalist accounts fail to engage with the most common way in which corporations cause 
harm – due to lack or failure by the organisation as a whole – rather than individual 
culpability, particularly at the executive level. This is shown in each of the Royal Commission 
reports which all too commonly highlight a lack of knowledge or care, despite being 
recognised as sites of risk for particular offences. Organisations can be structured in such a 
way that malfeasance and concerns about it, are unlikely to reach upper management – this 
means that the directing mind will lack the necessary criminal intent. This entrenched 
ignorance may be by design in order to avoid culpability under existing common law 
                                                          
40 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153. 
41 Campbell (n 41), 58. 
42 Brent W Fisse, ‘Consumer Protection and Corporate Criminal Responsibilty - A Critique of Tesco 
Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass’ (1971) 4(1) Adelaide Law Review 113-129. Margaret Gilbert, ‘Who’s to Blame? 
Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Implications for Group Members’ (2006) 30(1) Midwest studies in 
philosophy 94-114; Lo (n 40). 
43 Colvin (n 32). 
44 The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894: MV Herald of Free Enterprise - Report of the Court No. 8074, 10 (Justice 
Sheen).  
45 R v P&O European Ferries Ltd (1990) 93 Cr App R 72. 
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doctrine, but may also be a practical result of the diffusion of responsibility and authority in 
large, complex organisations.46  
 
This weakness of identification doctrine is demonstrated in the Banking Royal Commission 
case-study analysis of Rabobank’s loans to the Brauers.47 In summary, the Brauers owned a 
farm and had been customers of Rabobank since 2004 and had a credit limit of $1 million 
with Rabobank. In 2009, the Brauers had rented out their property and relocated overseas. 
They were emailed by their loan manager who advised them that a neighbouring property 
was on the market. Although the Brauers had not previously been looking to purchase, they 
expressed interest and the loan manager valued the property. He then advised the Brauers 
that they could borrow extra money and later use undrawn funds from their original loan to 
stock the farms with cattle on their return. The loan manager prepared a credit submission 
to Rabobank’s credit department. In September 2009, a representative from the credit 
department emailed the loan manager flagging problems with the credit submission, 
including that the proposed gearing was high and that ‘serviceability was very hard to get a 
grip on’. The credit report also noted that the assumptions about cattle numbers and prices 
were either wrong or debateable and no allowance had been made for living expenses. The 
loan manager emailed the Brauers that day but did not communicate the concerns of the 
credit department as to whether they would be able to meet the debt. The Brauers 
accepted the loan and purchased the neighbouring property. Upon their return the Brauers 
were introduced to a different Rabobank employee who was to be their new loan manager, 
Mr Brady, who in contrast with email communications by their previous loan manager, 
stated that finance to restock the farm would only be available if the Brauers repaid $3 
million within two years. After their property flooded and the Australian Government 
banned live export of cattle to Indonesia, the Brauers were unable to repay the $3 million 
and their interest rate was increased by 4% above the standard rate. After mediation, the 
Brauers sold the farm but lost more than $1 million in the process.  
 
                                                          
46 Diamantis (n 1) 328. 
47 This is a summary from the Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, Interim Report (2018) vol 2, 388-404.  
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Although the regional manager, Mr James, initially asserted that Rabobank had not engaged 
in any misconduct, upon reflection he agreed that contrary to the written terms of the loan, 
the loan manager’s emails gave an impression that further funds would be available for 
livestock purchases. The bank also had not revealed the credit department’s concerns to the 
Brauers that they would be unable to service the debt even in the best of circumstances. 
There were no internal systems requiring the communication of the credit department’s 
concerns to the customers. Nor were there any policies or systems in place to ensure that 
credit department queries or concerns were attended to prior to loan approval. The Royal 
Commission found that in the Brauers’ case, the loan should not have been approved.48 
Rabobank also did not have systems to militate against conflicts of interest. There was no 
separation of internal appraisal of property values from the function of loan origination and 
security valuation. These tasks were accomplished by the loan manager who was 
‘incentivised’ to write loans, and there was no internal appraisal of his or her assessments. 
Moreover, Rabobank employees who undertook valuations had not been specifically 
trained. APRA and Ernst and Young made recommendations in 2009 and 2011, requesting 
Rabobank to review its valuation policies and to separate loan valuations from the loan 
originator, as there was a risk of overvaluation by the loan originator, whether deliberately 
or in error. Despite recommendations by Ernst and Young and APRA, Rabobank did not 
separate loan origination from security valuation until 2014.  
 
This case study shows the deficiencies of identification theory. The Brauers’ loan manager 
would not be sufficiently senior to be regarded as the ‘brain and nerve centre’ of the bank.49 
The absence of any oversight or review of the loan manager’s practices – from loan 
origination, valuation, email promises – militated against more senior staff, the directing 
mind, becoming aware of systemic issues. Rabobank’s senior executives were physically and 
mentally remote from the operations that created the opportunity for malfeasance. The 
Rabobank example demonstrates how identification doctrine may lead an organisation to 
have an ambivalent relationship with knowledge – the more that they know about their 
practices and procedures the more able they will be to predict and prevent misconduct, but 
                                                          
48 Ibid 401. 
49 HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons [1957] 1 QB 159. See also, R v AC Hatrick Chemical Pty Ltd 
(1995) 152 A Crim R 384.  
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also the more likely a prosecution will be successful.50 Identification theory may actually 
have perverse consequences of discouraging auditing – the less executives know the better 
in terms of common law doctrine. The Royal Commission found that Rabobank had 
inadequate ‘systems and procedures’ and ‘difficulties in internal controls and management 
systems’.51 Drawing on the findings of the Royal Commission, I would argue that Rabobank 
had a responsibility to put procedures in place to train staff in valuations, ensure valuations 
were independent, and that credit department recommendations were addressed and 
communicated to customers. This lack of procedures, training and auditing meant that 
Rabobank had failed to discharge its legal duty of care to customers and also ensured that 
senior executives (and staff) were unaware of any problems with the lending process. This 
failure was not due to specific individuals, rather it was the very policies and systems (or 
lack thereof) in place that militated against awareness or knowledge, in and of themselves 
reflecting a lack of care by the organisation.  
 
B. Alternative models – realist approach 
In contrast to the dominant nominalist approach, realist theories assert that corporations 
are more than just the sum of their parts52 and that they are capable of being autonomous 
legal actors.53 This realist approach is reflected in the recent Royal Commissions, where the 
Royal Commissions and media referred to harms caused and malfeasance by specific 
organisations such as AMP, NAB, Oakden Facility, and the Catholic Church.54 Whilst it might 
be argued that labelling corporations in this way is simply a matter of linguistic convenience 
but does not reflect the reality of corporate responsibility,55 realist theorists assert that an 
organisation can have its own discrete responsibility, beyond the aggregation of the 
responsibility of individuals.56 The realist approach is informed by studies in collectives and 
                                                          
50 Diamantis (n 1) 330. 
51 Banking Royal Commission (n 49) 402. 
52 See, eg, Susanna M Kim, ‘Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule 
to Corporations’ (2000) 2000(3) Illinois Law Review 763-811; Meir Dan-Cohen (n32). 
53 Hill (n 33). 
54 See, eg, Banking Royal Commission (n 18) NAB 1-16, AMP 123-157; Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality 
(n 6) Oakden 62-63; Royal Commission Child Sexual Abuse (n 17) Case Study 4, on the Catholic Church and its 
responses to abuse.  
55 John Hasnas, ‘Reflections on Corporate Moral Responsibility and the Problem Solving Technique of 
Alexander the Great’ 107(2) Journal of Business Ethics 183-195.  
56 Fisse (n 14). See also, Alice Belcher, ‘Imagining How A Company Thinks: What Is Corporate Culture?’ (2006) 
11(2) Deakin Law Review 1-21.  
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organisational behaviour that organisations and collectives often develop an identity that is 
independent of and transcends the specific individuals who control or work within the 
organisation.57 
 
Offences informed by realist theories have been introduced by statute to address perceived 
shortcomings of common law. Australian corporate culture provisions in the Criminal Code 
Act1995 (Cth) Part 2.5 reflect a realist approach. The Code applies to bodies corporate in the 
same way as it applies to individuals, but modifications have been developed to reflect 
differences between corporations and individuals.58 Section 12.3 of the Criminal Code states 
that if intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element of an offence, that ‘fault 
element must be attributed to the body corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.’59 Subsections 12.3(2)(c) and 
12.3(2)(d) are radical in their conceptualisation and attribution of fault elements for 
offences committed by corporations based on the concept of corporate culture. Body 
corporate authorisation or permission can be established expressly or through a ‘corporate 
culture’ that tolerated or led to the commission of the offence or failure to create or 
maintain a ‘corporate culture’ that would not tolerate or would lead to the commission of 
the offence. Corporate culture is defined in the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 Part 
2.5 as ‘an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body 
corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities 
takes place’. ‘Corporate culture’ is intended to encompass situations where the actual 
practices of an organization differ from its formal or written rules.60  
                                                          
57 For example, Gilbert has argued that collective attitudes are distinct from and cannot be analysed in terms 
of an aggregate or sum of individual attitudes. See Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in 
Plural Subject Theory (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Gilbert (n 44). See also, John Searle, ‘Collective 
Intentions and Actions’ in J Morgan Cohen and ME Pollack (eds), Intentions in Communication (1990) 401; 
Marion Smiley, ‘From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Rethinking Collective Moral Responsibility’ (2010) 
19(1) Journal of Law and Policy 171-202, 201. 
58 Section 12.1. 
59 Sub-sections 12.3 (2)(a) and (b) reflects identification theory from Tesco v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 with 
traditional agency provisions for attributing the state of mind of the ‘directing mind’ to the corporation, while 
the definition of high managerial agent is consistent with the approach of Meridian Global Funds Management 
Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 All ER 918. Where conduct is that of a high managerial agent, an 
organisation can defend itself on the basis that it is able to show that it had adequate corporate management, 
control or supervision of the conduct per section 12.3(3). See Tahnee Woolf, ‘The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
- Towards a Realist Vision of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1997) 21(5) Criminal Law Journal 257-272. 




The corporate culture provisions are widely regarded as innovative and ‘modern,’61 
providing ‘arguably the most sophisticated model of corporate criminal liability in the 
world’.62 The provisions reflect a realist or ‘holistic’ approach aiming to capture the 
blameworthiness of the corporation as an entity – it does not rely on the actions or 
omissions of an individual but instead considers the organization as a whole.63 Whilst the 
corporate culture provisions are successful in terms of providing a realist normative 
account, the concept of corporate culture has rarely been employed in corporate 
prosecutions.64 Colvin and Argent have summarized some of the criticisms of corporate 
culture that have militated against its success such as the failure of the regulations to reflect 
a more nuanced understanding of corporate culture from an organizational theory 
perspective, and asking whether corporate culture can ever be regulated.65 The provisions 
are specifically excluded from operating in other corporate legislation including the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), greatly 
reducing the likelihood of prosecution and accordingly, judicial interpretation of the 
provisions.66  
 
The UK has introduced an alternative (but related) realist approach to corporate liability, 
that of failure to prevent offences.67 The Bribery Act 2010 (UK) provides that an organisation 
                                                          
61 John C Coffee, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: An Introduction and Comparative Survey’ in Albin Eser, Gunter 
Heine and Barbara Huber (eds), Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Individuals (Edition Iuscrim, 
1999) 9, 20. 
62 Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford University Press, 2002) 138. 
63 Karen Wheelwright, ‘Goodbye Directing Mind and Will, Hello Management Failure: A Brief Critique of Some 
New Models of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2006) 19(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 287-303. 
64 There has been one prosecution in which the culture provisions have been relied upon: R v Potter and Mures 
Fishing Pty Ltd [2015] TASSC 44. Lewis argues that compliance culture has been a long-standing area of 
investigation and enforcement. See Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41076, 52, 152; Lewis ( 
n 13) 93. For an analysis of the limitations of the corporate culture provisions with regard to foreign 
subsidiaries see Radha Ivory and Anna John, ‘Holding Companies Responsible: The Criminal Liability of 
Australian Corporations for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations’ (2017) 40(2) UNSW Law Journal 1175. 
65 Colvin and Argent (n 7). See also Carol Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Australian Cartel Regulation: Law, 
Policy and Practice in an International Context (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Cf there are many theorists 
who argue that organisational culture is a key driver of corporate crime and misconduct. See, eg, Jamie-Lee 
Campbell and Aja Goritz, ‘Culture Corrupts! A Qualitative Study of Organisational Culture in Corrupt 
Organisations’ (2014) 120(3) Journal of Business Ethics 291. 
66 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether corporate culture should be retained and expanded 
more broadly or jettisoned (as recommended recently by the ALRC). ALRC (n 23). 
67 The proposed Australian offence of failure to prevent bribery is modelled on the UK offence. See Crimes 
Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2019. 
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will be guilty of a failure to prevent offence unless it can prove that it had adequate 
procedures to prevent bribery.68 The UK followed up with a failure to prevent facilitation of 
tax evasion offence in the Criminal Finances Act 2017, with a defence of ‘reasonable’ 
procedures to prevent the conduct. The Joint Select Committee on Human Rights has since 
recommended a new corporate offence of failure to prevent human rights abuses69 and the 
Ministry of Justice has argued in favour of creating a new corporate offence of failure to 
prevent economic crime.70 The failure to prevent bribery offence has enjoyed some practical 
success. At the time of writing, seven corporations had been prosecuted by the Serious 
Fraud Office under section 7 of the Bribery Act 2017. Of these, one pleaded guilty,71 five 
involved Deferred Prosecution Agreements72 and one was contested (resulting in the 
conviction of the dormant company of failing to prevent bribery).73  
 
In March 2019, the Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010 tabled a report to the House 
of Lords.74 The Select Committee has argued that the offence is ‘remarkably successful’ in 
terms of prosecution but also encourages the prevention of harms by those most capable of 
preventing it – the organisation itself (that is, deterrence).75 The practical success (in terms 
of prosecution) of the failure to prevent offence in the UK reflects the reality that many of 
the harms caused by large organisations are due to omissions, that is, the failure to prevent 
                                                          
68 Wells (n 10). 
69 Joint Select Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights and Business, ‘Promoting responsibility and 
ensuring accountability,’ Select Committee 67 (Webpage) 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/443/443.pdf 191 – 193.See also Ivory and 
John (n 64). 
70 Celia Wells, ‘Corporate Failure to Prevent Economic Crime – A Proposal’ (2017)6 Crim LR 426-439, 427.  
Wells argues in favour of extending the failure to prevent offence to other economic crimes.  
71 R v Sweett Group Pty PLC (Unreported, Southwark Crown Court, 19 February 2016).  
72 DPAs are an agreement reached between the prosecutor and a corporate entity that could be prosecuted 
for a crime. In the UK, DPAs must be approved by a judge who is persuaded that the DPA is ‘in the interests of 
justice’ and that its terms are ‘fair, reasonable and proportionate.’ For approved DPAs see, eg, Serious Fraud 
Office v Airbus SE (Unreported, Southwark Crown Court, 31 January 2020); Serious Fraud Office v Guralp 
Systems Ltd (Unreported, Royal Courts of Justice, 22 October 2019); Serious Fraud Office v Sarclad Ltd 
(Unreported, Royal Courts of Justice, 11 July 2016); Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc (Unreported, 
Royal Courts of Justice,  30 November 2015); Serious Fraud Office v XYZ Limited (Unreported, Royal Courts of 
Justice, 8 July 2016); Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce PLC and Rolls Royce Energy Systems Inc (Unreported, 
Royal Courts of Justice, 17 January 2017).  
73 R v Skansen Interiors Ltd (Unreported, Southwark Crown Court, 2018). House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Bribery Act, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Post Legislative Scrutiny,’ (Webpage, 14 March 2019) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldbribact/303/303.pdf>. 
74 Above n73 House of Lords. 
75 Ibid 3. 
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harms or breaches of legal duty.76 I will now consider the failure to prevent offence in 
Australia in relation to the three Royal Commissions in terms of how the offences might 
work in practice, but also how and why the offence establishes culpability of the 
organisation.  
 
III FAILURE TO PREVENT A FOUNDATIONAL OFFENCE OR A BREACH OF LEGAL DUTY? 
The failure to prevent offence in the UK requires the individual commission of a specific 
substantive, predicate or foundational offence.77 In the UK, this requires that an employee 
or agent associated with the corporation committed bribery or facilitated the evasion of 
taxes. For those harms analysed by the Child Sexual Abuse Royal Commission the 
foundational offence committed by an employee or agent associated with the institution 
would draw upon the cohort of existing child sex offences – including underage sex, 
grooming and failure to report.78 Given that institutions that care for children are recognised 
as sites of risk for child sexual abuse there are already guidelines in place and mandatory 
reporting of grooming and underage sex.79 Fulfilment of legal duties of care is (ostensibly) 
attached to accreditation and funding (although the Royal Commission noted the relative 
absence of enforcement).80  
 
Likewise, aged care providers that receive government funding must comply with duties and 
responsibilities under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth). The foundational offence could include 
a breach of the existing legal duty of care that should be provided to consumers. 
Alternatively, a standalone offence of failure to prevent elder abuse could be created. The 
World Health Organisation has defined elder abuse as ‘a single or repeated act, or lack of 
appropriate action, occurring within any relationship where there is an expectation of trust 
which causes harm or distress to an older person’ – which may be ‘financial, physical, 
                                                          
76 Lewis has recently argued that ‘there is still no evidence that it [the bribery offence] has been effective in 
reducing the prevalence of foreign bribery or improving corporate compliance culture.’ He points to the recent 
Airbus settlement which covered extensive bribes that occurred after the enactment of the new failing to 
prevent offence. See Lewis (n 13).  
77 It is argued that the foundational offence supplements intentionality. IB Lee, “Corporate Criminal 
Responsibility as Team Member Responsibility” (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 755-788, 761.  
78 The offences of child sexual abuse and grooming are considered in depth in the Royal Commission into Child 
Abuse Final Reports. See Royal Commission into Child Abuse (n 17) 194-206.   
79 Ibid 202.  
80 Ibid 139. 
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psychological and sexual… [and] can also be the result of intentional or unintentional 
neglect.’81 The Interim Report of the Aged Care Royal Commission found many quality and 
safety issues that would amount to elder abuse including inadequate prevention and 
management of wounds, poor continence management, dreadful food and hydration, high 
incidence of assaults, and common use of restraints.82 For the purpose of analysis, this 
article will focus on the use of restraint as an example of elder abuse as the foundational 
offence. There are different definitions of restraints within Australia reflecting the 
‘challenges in conceptualising and identifying restraint in practice’.83 New national standards 
were introduced from July 2019, defining restraint as any practice, device or action that 
interferes with a consumer’s ability to make a decision or restricts a consumer’s free 
movement.84 Despite a global trend promoting ‘restraint free’ environments in aged care,85 
the Interim Report notes ‘restrictive practices are common in Australia.’86 Examples of 
physical restraint include the removal of mobility aid for ‘safety’,87 clasping a person’s hands 
or feet to stop them moving, applying restraints or lap belts, locking over bed or chair tray 
tables, seating residents in chairs with deep seats that the resident cannot stand up from, 
and confining a person.88 Chemical restriction is the prescription of psychotropic medication 
exceeding reasonably expected clinical needs of the people receiving care. Aged care 
facilities are recognised as sites of risk for elder abuse including restraint.89  There is a legal 
duty of care and mandatory reporting – from July 2019 it has been mandatory for residential 
care service providers to provide data on three quality indicators including physical 
restraints to the Department of Health.90 In addition, psychotropic medicines are prescribed 
and/or controlled. Despite this, the organisational breach of legal duty of care has not been 
enforced in the criminal justice system. 
                                                          
81 World Health Organization, ‘Elder abuse,’ Ageing and life-course (Webpage) 
<http://www.who.int/ageing/projects/elder_abuse/en/>    
82 Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality (n 6) 4-7. 
83 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, Restrictive Practices in Residential 
Aged Care in Australia, Background Paper 4 (2019) 5.  
84 Quality of Care Amendment (Minimising the Use of Restraints) Principles 2019, section 4. 
85 Janet Timmins, ‘Compliance with Best Practice: Implementing the Best Available Evidence in the Use of 
Physical Restraint in Residential Aged Care’ (2008) 6(3) International Journal of Evidence Based Health Care 
345-350. 
86 Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality (n 6) 193. 
87 Ibid 196. 
88 Ibid 2. 
89 Australian Law Reform Commission, Elder Abuse: A National Legal Response (Report No 131, 2017) 11. 




The Banking Royal Commission highlighted a great deal of malfeasance and criminality by 
financial institutions such as home loans which people could not afford, fees for no service, 
sale of ‘zombie’ (or worthless) insurance, and charging fees to people who have died.91 For 
the purpose of analysis, this article will focus on fees for no service as an example of banking 
criminality. On a basic interpretation fees for no service are fraud.92 Hayne stated that fees 
for no service could be prosecuted under section 1041G of the Corporations Act which 
specifies that it is a civil and criminal offence for a company, or individual within it, to 
engage in ‘dishonest conduct’ relating to a financial product or service.93 Financial 
institutions are recognised as sites of risk for financial malfeasance and crime. As with the 
other Royal Commissions, guidelines, duties of care and mandatory reporting are already in 
place, they just do not seem to be enforced.94  
 
A practical issue in relation to the development of a failure to prevent offence in Australia is 
that it requires a predicate offence if the UK prototype is followed. All three Royal 
Commissions highlighted widespread wrongdoing. There are advantages to having specific 
offences as these put organisations on notice to develop policies and practices in response 
to specific risks. Creating a stand-alone offence, like the failure to prevent bribery, expresses 
that certain offences are sufficiently wrongful in and of themselves that organisations have 
a legal responsibility to prevent them, and the failure to have adequate procedures in place 
to prevent specific offences is culpable. However, leaving aside the Child Sexual Abuse Royal 
Commission which was specifically focused on sexual abuse and grooming – it is difficult to 
isolate the offences uncovered by the other Royal Commissions. The malfeasance unveiled 
in the Aged Care and Banking Royal Commissions is broad and varied. An alternative route 
would be to base the predicate offence upon breaches of (organisational) legal duty. In all of 
the examples above organisations had pre-existing legal duties of care with regard to 
specific risks and mandatory reporting of breaches of these legal duties. Accordingly, there 
                                                          
91 Banking Royal Commission (n 18). 
92 The Commonwealth Criminal Code defines obtaining property by deception as ‘the person, by a deception, 
dishonestly obtains property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of 
the property.’ See section 134.1(1)(a). 
93 Banking Royal Commission (n 18) 154. 
94 These duties of care are summarised in Banking Royal Commission Final Report. Ibid. 
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are clear ways in which organisations can transgress the law, that is, by failing to fulfil a legal 
duty. Accordingly, an offence of failure to prevent a breach of legal duty by organisations 
could be created. Whilst basing the failure to prevent offence on a breach of legal duty may 
appear to draw the offence too broadly, the organisation would then have an opportunity 
to argue a defence (considered below).  
 
IV SITES OF RISK AND THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE PROCEDURES 
The key way in which the offence of failure to prevent incorporates notions of 
organisational blameworthiness (or lack thereof) is by giving an organisation the 
opportunity to defend itself.95 The defence provides an organisation the opportunity to 
establish a lack of culpability, that is, that the failure to prevent the offence was not due to 
an absence of reasonable or adequate procedures on the organisation’s part. Under the 
Bribery Act UK, it is a defence for an organisation to prove that it had in place adequate 
prevention procedures. The Criminal Finances Act 2017 provides a defence that, when the 
UK tax evasion facilitation offence was committed, it had in place reasonable prevention 
procedures.96 Unlike with the Bribery Act there is no need for the organisation to receive, or 
be intended to receive, benefit. Proof of benefit, or the intention of benefit, would confirm 
a link between the associated person’s actions and the corporation. However, in light of the 
findings by the Royal Commissions, I would argue in favour of removing the benefit 
requirement in relation to failure to prevent offences. For example, child sexual abuse is not 
in the interest of an organisation caring for children. In relation to elder abuse, there may be 
indirect ways in which elder abuse is to the benefit of an organisation, for example, 
malnutrition or understaffing to save money, but it is more straightforward to argue that 
malnutrition and understaffing is due to organisational failure rather than attempting to 
identify and prove nefarious motives by management. The Banking Royal Commission 
highlighted wrongdoing that was for the benefit of the organisation (such as fees for no 
service; financial advisers acting against interests of client in favour of selling in-house 
                                                          
95 In its recent discussion paper on corporate law reform, the Australian Law Reform Commission has proposed 
a defence of due diligence as comparable to the reasonable/adequate procedure defence in the UK. ALRC (n 
23) chapter 6.  
96 This is a slightly different wording of Bribery Act and Finances Act defences. Campbell has stated that though 
‘one could question why the defences were not standardised, it seems to be the case that lobbying from 
financial institutions provided the driver to adopt reasonableness, as apparently the less onerous standard.’ 
Campbell (n 41) 61. 
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products), but other malfeasance was not in the interests of the bank (bribery, minimal 
deposits in children’s’ bank accounts, and many fees for no service were of benefit to the 
financial adviser, not the bank). Accordingly, the requirement of benefit to the organisation 
is tangential or misleading from the key question of whether or not the organisation itself 
was culpable.  
 
Guidance about the new offences and the types of risk-based procedures that a company 
can put in place to limit the risk of representatives criminally bribing or facilitating tax 
evasion has been published for both UK offences, using the same principles for both 
offences (UK Guidelines). 97 The requirements of the six principles are considered and 
explained in some detail and they are followed by case studies explaining how the principles 
might apply in different hypothetical situations.98 The UK Guidelines specify an organisation 
should establish proportionate procedures, top-level commitment, risk assessment, due 
diligence, communication and monitoring and review. These UK Guidelines are consistent 
with the recommendations of situational crime prevention, which recognise that situations 
can influence or provide an opportunity for criminal behaviour, but also provide behavioural 
cues and structures to discourage criminal behaviour.99 This is in accordance with arguments 
by realists that corporate culture or ethos can have a major impact on how employees 
behave, encouraging and discouraging, rewarding and punishing. 100  
 
                                                          
97 U.K Government has provided guidance for the corporate offences of failure to prevent the criminal 
facilitation of tax evasion. See, Her Majesty’s Government, Tackling Tax Evasion: Corporate Offences, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/672231/
Tackling-tax-evasion-corporate-offences.pdf. See also, the Facilitation of Tax Evasion Offences (Guidance About 
Prevention) Regulations 2017 (UK).  Guidelines would need to be developed if an Australian offence of failure 
to prevent breach of legal duty was to be introduced. The Attorney General has also released Draft Guidance 
on the steps a body corporate can take to prevent an associate from bribing foreign public officials for the 
proposed Australian CLACCC Bill (November 2019) https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Draft-
guidance-on-adequate-procedures-to-prevent-the-commission-of-foreign-bribery.pdf.  
98 The Select Committee on the Bribery Act recommended clarification of the Guidance – particularly taking 
into account different size of companies and also the issue of reasonable as opposed to adequate procedures. 
Select Committee on the Bribery Act (n 73). 
99 The literature in this area is prolific but a good summary in application to white collar crime is Michael L 
Benson, Tamara D Madensen and John E Eck, ‘White-Collar Crime from an Opportunity Perspective’ in Sally S 
Simpson and David Weisburg (eds), The Criminology of White-Collar Crime (Springer, 2009) 175. 
100 Pamela H Bucy, ‘Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1991) 75(4) 
Minnesota Law Review 1095-1184. 
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The UK Guidelines and concepts of situational crime prevention are consistent with the 
arguments of the UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act that the failure to prevent offence 
puts the onus of responsibility on those most capable of preventing the harms. The defence 
provides organisations with an incentive and opportunity to avoid criminal liability by 
implementing appropriate internal procedures and policies and embed risk assessment in 
their organisation.101 Each Royal Commission has highlighted the relevance of these 
guidelines to meeting duties of care and preventing offences. As noted above, in all three 
Royal Commissions, the organisations had already been recognised as sites of risk for 
particular crimes and malfeasance.102 In addition, specific duties that had already been 
imposed on these organisations were not met.  
 
The Child Sexual Abuse Royal Commission published reports about findings at specific 
organisations and also summarised various institutional failings in response to child sexual 
abuse.103 For example, in terms of the failure to prevent defence Guidelines, the Royal 
Commission commented on the lack of top-level commitment to preventing child sexual 
abuse in schools, stating that failure to respond adequately was due to ‘poor leadership and 
governance’.104  This was reflected particularly in cultures that prioritised protecting the 
school’s reputation, financial interests or particular colleagues over the safety of children. 
There was an absence of proportionate procedures. The Royal Commission pointed to poor 
human resource management which allowed sex offenders to be employed, due to the 
failure to follow internal procedures for recruitment, any of which would have resulted in 
the offender not having been employed in the first place.105 The failure to respond 
adequately which facilitated ongoing abuse, was due to inadequate complaints processes, 
investigations and disciplinary actions, which also led to staff failing to meet their 
obligations to report suspected abuse to external authorities. This was exacerbated by poor 
                                                          
101 Dervan (n 36). 
102 See, eg, John Braithwaite, ‘The Nursing Home Industry’ (1993) 18 Crime and Justice: Review of Research 11. 
See also, Banking Royal Commission (n 18). 
103 For a detailed case study of failings see Crofts (n 5). 
104 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Report: Schools 
(2017) vol 13. 
105 For example, management failed to follow recruitment procedures such as contacting referees and 
undertaking police checks. See Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual 
Abuse, Report of Case Study No. 9: The responses of the Catholic Archdiocese of Adelaide and the South 
Australian Police, to allegations of child sexual abuse at St Ann’s Special School. (‘Report of Case Study No. 9’). 
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recordkeeping and sharing of information. There was frequently also lack of communication 
in the form of an absence or lack of implementation of policies and procedures which failed 
to provide staff with adequate training as to how to recognise grooming behaviours and 
child sexual abuse and what to do in response.106 The Royal Commission reports also 
pointed to other failures according to basic child protection procedures including the failure 
to scrutinise suspicious behaviour107 and permitting unsupervised contact with children.108  
 
Similarities in systemic failure have also been highlighted in the ongoing Aged Care Royal 
Commission. All available literature emphasises that the failure to prevent overuse of 
restraint is a structural issue:  
The reduction of physical restraint requires an operational policy. Elements of such a 
policy would include: adaptation to environmental factors – for example, 
architecture, choice of materials; appointment of resource persons; an 
interdisciplinary approach (including the older persons and their relatives); 
registration of the use of physical restraint; communication about the policy 
pursued, and so on.109  
The emphasis upon operational policy is consistent with the UK Guidelines, requiring top 
level commitment in terms of architecture, adoption of a prevention policy, training staff in 
alternatives, monitoring the use of restraints and the regular and targeted review of 
residents taking psychotropic medication. Physical and social care environments must be 
designed to be beneficial for people with dementia.110 Organisational policies and medical 
reviews need to be implemented and communicated,111 based on evidence for the 
                                                          
106 Ibid. 
107 For example, the driver of the school bus for children with disabilities was frequently late in dropping off 
children. It was during this time that he offended against the children. See Report of Case Study No. 9 (n 105).  
108 See, eg, Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses into Child Abuse,  
 Report of Case Study No. 15: Response of swimming institutions, the Queensland and NSW Offices of the DPP 
and the Queensland Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian to allegations of child 
sexual abuse by swimming coaches (2014). Swimming Australia and Swimming Queensland allowed 
unsupervised access to children by Scott Volkers even after sexual abuse allegations had been made.  
109 Chris Gastmans and K Milisen, ‘Use of Physical Restraint in Nursing Homes: Clinical-Ethical Considerations’ 
(2006) 32(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 148-152, 151. 
110 Genise Marquardt, Kathrin Bueter and Tom Motzek, ‘Impact of the Design of the Built Environment on 
People with Dementia: An Evidence Based Review’ (2014) 8(1) Health Environments Research and Design 127-
157. 
111 Juanita Westbury, Johnny Lo, Peta Miller, Daveena Mawren and Brooklyn Jones, ‘RedUSe: Reducing 
Antipsychotic and Benzodiazepine Prescribing in Residential Aged Care Facilities’ (2018) 208(9) Medical Journal 
of Australia 398-403. 
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management of the behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia.112 The use of 
physical restraints is a collective issue that is usually visible to other staff (and residents) and 
the use of chemical restraints is prescribed by doctors and administered by staff. The 
commitment to reduce the use of restraint requires a collective undertaking – which 
facilitates and encourages caregivers to challenge one another about the use of restraint.113 
As with the failure to recognise and report grooming and child sexual abuse, training is 
key.114 Workload (another organisational issue) is also key. Even if staff have received 
training, they may use restraint as a means to manage their workload as alternatives to 
restraint require skill, time and patience.115 The over-use of restraint is not solely an 
individual issue – rather it is likely to be due to structural and collective reasons which can 
primarily be addressed at the organisational level. The failure to address the overuse of 
restraint at the organisational level is criminogenic, that is, it perpetuates crimes of elder 
abuse. 
 
Likewise, the Banking Royal Commissions highlighted systemic failures. It was clear that 
organisations such as AMP, NAB, CBA, Westpac, and MLC had charged members fees for no 
service (that is, the charging of fees for financial advice that is not provided or not provided 
in full) and had remuneration models that created conflicts of interest.116 Despite the risk of 
dishonesty there was an absence of processes to prevent and detect misconduct, failure by 
the entity to respond in a timely and sufficient way to misconduct, and slow/false mandated 
reporting of the offending.117 Almost all of these ‘systemic failures’ worked to the benefit of 
the banks. Fees for no service was endemic and undetected and/or not adequately 
responded to by the organisations for many years. 118For example, it was not until the Royal 
Commission that it became apparent that NAB had charged more than 200,000 customers 
millions of dollars in fees, even though it had not provided them with any advice.119 Many 
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accounts were not linked to any advisor but were still charged fees for advice.120 Concerns 
about fees for no service were raised as early as August 2015 with NAB creating a risk event 
in September 2015 and noting that ASIC and APRA should be notified of the breaches.121 
NAB entities NULIS and MLC Boards were advised that fees for no service were potential 
breaches in December 2015.122 In December 2017, a paper was presented at the NULIS 
Board meeting entitled Risk Review of ASF Controls.123 The paper found that controls to 
prevent, monitor and review fees for no services were ineffective overall and at times non-
existent.124 The paper proposed that a top-level commitment to prevent fees for no service 
was required, and that executive management should remediate the control 
environment.125 This expression of the need for organisational reform from the top-down is 
consistent with the defence Guidelines. 
One important aspect of the defence of reasonable procedures is that it broadens the time 
frame of analysis to consider not only past practice but how the corporation responds to 
wrongdoing.126 What kind of programme of reform, compensation and discipline does the 
organisation implement in response to discovering the malfeasance? For example, the Royal 
Commission found that despite a legal duty to do so, NAB demonstrated a failure to respond 
in an effective and timely manner. There was a failure to report breaches to ASIC in a timely 
and accurate manner. In addition:   
Rather than remediate promptly at that time, management and senior executives 
took steps to negotiate an outcome with ASIC that would minimise the financial and 
reputational fall-out for the NAB Group. NAB was unwilling to acknowledge that this 
behaviour was wrong.127  
NAB also tried to minimize any amounts that it would have to repay.128  
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The same could apply to other types of harms. Indicators of organisational failure would 
include long-term harms and the nature of the response of the organisation to those harms. 
For example, Knox school was the subject of a scathing report in the Royal Commission due 
to its failure to adequately respond to allegations of child sexual abuse from the 1970s until 
2012.129 At the time child sexual abuse was covered up, not reported to police, and 
offending staff were retained and protected or given glowing references.130 In contrast, 
according to media reports, in 2019 a staff member who was found with child abuse 
material on his phone was reported to the headmaster who immediately contacted the 
police stating: 
We will not hesitate to contact police and remove staff who fail to follow our code of 
conduct and the law.131 
This response can be compared to the report in the media of the headmaster of a different 
private school who expressed no support for children who reported grooming offences, 
choosing instead to give a glowing character reference for the offender (whilst the Royal 
Commission was ongoing).132 This shows a clear difference in organisational responses. One 
seeks to prevent child sexual offences whilst the other has the effect of facilitating or 
condoning child sexual abuse.133  
 
This analysis highlights the ways in which an organisation can be criminogenic in its failure 
to prevent or discourage crime.134 Good corporate culture in the form of policies and 
procedures can discourage and prevent wrongdoing, whilst bad corporate culture might 
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tolerate, permit or encourage malfeasance.135 In each institution that was analysed by the 
Royal Commissions, it is not an accident that offending behaviour occurred for long periods 
of time in specific organisations (and not in others). The offences were not one-off tragic 
‘accidents’ but were due to the structural failures for which an institution can and should be 
responsible.136 A failure by an organisation to meet the requirements of the UK Guidelines 
establishes the ways in which the organisation is criminogenic.137  
 
An essential factor in the likelihood of success of prosecution of the failure to prevent 
offence is that it imposes a ‘reverse burden defence’.138 That is, the harm caused, would be 
treated as an offence committed by the company unless and until the company proved 
otherwise.139 This approach was recommended as long ago as 1993 by Fisse and Braithwaite 
based on the concept of ‘reactive fault’.140 It assists with the likelihood of successful 
prosecutions because it circumvents evidentiary challenges.141 The defence requires 
corporations to prove that it had existing or had developed adequate or reasonable or 
proportionate measures to prevent the commission of the crime.142 The difficulty is that the 
reverse burden defence undermines a key tenet of the criminal law – the presumption of 
innocence.143 In a series of decisions, the UK and Canadian courts have held that the 
presumption of innocence is infringed in such a case, but that that infringement may be 
justified or proportionate, depending on the circumstances.144 A cogent argument can be 
made that there is no need for mechanistic application of rules and procedures that were 
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constructed around natural persons to be applied to corporations.145 Procedural protections 
such as the requirement that the prosecution negate defences beyond a reasonable doubt 
were constructed to protect individuals from the arbitrary exercise of power of the state, 
and there are defences at common law and under statute which individual accused are 
required to prove on the balance of probabilities.146 The argument about the power dynamic 
of the state against individuals does not apply, particularly to large organisations, some of 
which have greater profits than state GDPs. In addition, organisations cannot be 
imprisoned147 and unlike human beings, have no inherent rights to exist.148 The defence of 
adequate or reasonable procedures affords a defence to companies,149 gives them fair 
opportunity avoid causing harms,150 and provides strong encouragement to organisations to 
monitor and review their policies, procedures and responses to serious risks identified in 
their undertakings.151 It does not require D to prove lack of guilt, only the presence and use 
of adequate/reasonable procedures. It also allows corporations to exonerate themselves by 
pointing to their compliance procedures and policies, which given the opacity of 
corporations,152 is more appropriate for the corporation than for the prosecution to collect 
information and to prove details of internal policies and procedures and substantive 
practices within the organisation.153 Accordingly, the reverse onus of proof imposes a 
compliance incentive upon corporations that operate in areas which are recognised as 
generating specific risks, which they can and should attempt to prevent. 
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V. SUFFICIENT CULPABILITY TO JUSTIFY ATTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
The foregoing section has outlined the ways in which the offence achieves the potential for 
practical success in responding to the types of offences most commonly committed by large 
organisation – those due to omission or failure. The key question I will explore now is 
whether or not the failure to prevent offence satisfies a normative account, that is, is an 
organisation sufficiently blameworthy for failing to prevent harm? 
 
Two related arguments can be marshalled to justify the criminalisation of failure to prevent 
– those of harmful consequences and the blameworthiness of failure. A key justification for 
imposing a legal duty is to protect against the harms potentially caused by the breach.154 
The harm principle famously provides a basis for limiting and permitting state intervention 
as stated by J.S.Mill: ‘The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’155 On this 
basis, criminalisation is justified through the (potential) harmful consequences. Harmful 
consequences remain a foundation for many offences including regulatory offences (such as 
food adulteration, dangerous driving) but also those with serious penalties such as 
involuntary manslaughter where legal culpability is due to causing death, with minimal to no 
intentional wrongdoing is required for culpability.156 Feinberg defines ‘harm’ as a lasting or 
significant set-back to a person’s interests.157 There is no doubt that the breach of duties of 
care highlighted in the Royal Commissions were harmful. The Child Sexual Abuse Royal 
Commission devoted a great deal of time to recording and representing the devastatingly 
harmful consequences of child sexual abuse and grooming.158 In terms of physical and 
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chemical restraint of the elderly all the evidence asserts that it does more harm than 
benefit.159 The use of restraints not only breaches fundamental rights of the elderly but can 
seriously undermine physical and psychological health including premature deaths,160 loss of 
muscle mass, and increasing likelihood of falls.161 Restraints increase agitation, discomfort 
and anxiety. Meanwhile, fraud by the banks resulted in material loss to many customers, 
but also stress, suicides, loss of retirement plans.162 Hayne also argued that malfeasance by 
the banks was harmful to the economy as it undermined trust in financial institutions.163 The 
corporate law theorist David Uhlmann has accordingly argued that conviction 
communicates the state’s intolerance of incidences of massive harms.164 The flipside is that 
the failure to convict communicates tolerance by the state of these harms, as if the harms 
were an unfortunate part of doing business. 
 
Whilst the pattern of blameworthiness of harmful consequences provides a powerful 
foundation for criminalisation, it seems counter intuitive to hold a person (or a corporation) 
responsible for something that they failed to do, because the dominant model of culpability 
is that a person cannot, and should not, be held responsible unless they intentionally or 
knowingly did the wrong thing.165 The moral philosopher, Mary Midgely, has labelled this 
the ‘positive model’ of wickedness.166 There are two aspects to this model of wickedness – 
first of all, action, and secondly, with intention or knowledge. The emphasis that only 
positive action can be culpable is reflected in concerns voiced by critics that corporations 
should not be held criminally liable for the failure to prevent.167 This is based on arguments 
that criminal legal doctrine generally is reluctant to criminalise omissions – whether by 
individuals or corporations. Despite these arguments, an accused can be held liable for 
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omissions in the majority of criminal offences provided a legal duty to act has been 
established.168 All the institutions considered in case studies in the Royal Commissions had 
legal duties to protect the people in their care, duties of honesty and duties to act in the 
best interests of their members, and in most of the case studies the organisations failed 
long-term to fulfil these duties. The criminalisation of omissions is particularly appropriate 
for organisations that choose to work in areas that are regulated.169 Moreover, criminal 
responsibility for the breach of legal duties is a common trope of corporate law.170 Directors 
owe a legal duty to the company, and the breach of this duty may result in criminal 
liability.171 Specific legislative schemes impose duties upon corporations and directors 
including occupational health and safety, environmental and tax. In all of these offences 
liability derives from a failure to meet a duty of care – a duty of care that the corporation is 
subject to as a consequence of undertaking the provision of specific goods and services.  
 
The second assumption of the positive model of wickedness is that a person acted 
intentionally or knowingly. Criminal legal doctrine reflects this ‘positive account’ of 
wickedness in its assertion of the dominance of subjectivist accounts of culpability to 
establish fault.172 Indeed, the High Court has held in favour of an assumption of mens rea or 
subjective blameworthiness as a general principle of criminal law doctrine.173 This model of 
culpability aims to ensure that outcomes that were accidental or unintended are not 
criminalised.174 The High Court argued against holding legal subjects liable in the absence of 
subjective culpability due to a concern for ‘luckless victims’ and the perceived severity of 
convicting an accused in the absence of any ‘fault’ on his or her part.175 The difficulty is that 
in many contemporary organisations, particularly large, complex, multi-nationals, 
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knowledge is diffused. Organisational structures may themselves militate against any 
capacity to prove knowledge or intention. In fact, as argued above, nominalism may 
encourage organisations to diffuse knowledge in order to avoid corporate liability.176 The 
positive model of wickedness fails to adequately deal with the ways in which organisations 
are most likely to cause harm. We need to draw upon alternative models of wickedness to 
recalibrate the accidents, collateral damage and harms which organisations are the most 
capable of preventing as failings which are sufficiently blameworthy to justify criminal 
sanctions.  
 
There are alternative accounts of wickedness that assert that failure or absence can be 
sufficiently blameworthy. In fact, despite passionate judicial statements asserting the 
requirement of subjective culpability, there are many offences at common law and under 
statute which do not require or impose minimal requirements of subjective culpability.177 
This reflects Justice Kirby’s assertion that subjective intention does not enjoy a ‘monopoly 
on moral culpability’.178  Philosophies of wickedness point to alternative models of 
culpability. Mary Midgley has argued that we should resuscitate the classic model of 
wickedness – a negative account.179 The subjective model of culpability remains necessary – 
there are corporations that have criminal models of business – but the positive model is 
insufficient to cope with the likely causes of harm by large organisations in the 21st century. 
In many cases of systemic harms, it is the lack of knowledge and care, the failure of policies 
and procedures, that is culpable. The negative account provides an alternative model of 
wickedness. The theologian Augustine, who stated “Evil has no positive nature; but the loss 
of good has received the name ‘evil’”.180 For Augustine evil is not a ‘thing’ but a corruption 
and warping of that which is good.181 The negative account conceives of evil as privation, 
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something missing, dearth or failure. The negative model of wickedness provides a 
philosophical foundation for the conception of corporate failure as culpable. Corporations 
are most likely to inflict systemic harms due to a failure to prevent and a failure to 
adequately respond to harms. The negative model of culpability provides a means to 
redefine ‘responsibility practices’,182 emphasising that it is this failure to act that has caused 
the systemic harms, and it precisely this failure that is culpable. The defence of reasonable  
procedures provides organisations an opportunity to prove that the harmful consequences 
caused by (agents of) the organisation were not due to the failures of the organisation. As 
shown above, the institutions that were subjects of each of the Royal Commission would 
not have been able to point to reasonable procedures to protect against those harms for 
which they had a legal duty of care. These organisations were not ‘luckless victims’ and 
under the classic model of wickedness their failures would be sufficiently culpable to justify 
and require criminal sanctions.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
The findings of each of the Royal Commissions demonstrate that a realist approach to 
corporate criminal accountability is vital. Despite the widespread harms recorded in each of 
the Royal Commissions the criminal justice system has failed to engage with organisational 
fault. In light of the increasing dominance and our increasing reliance upon large, complex 
corporations, reframing our notions of organisations and attributions of culpability is an 
urgent challenge for the twenty-first century. Rather than regarding harms as sad accidents, 
collateral damage or tragedies, criminal law needs to recalibrate these harms as crimes that 
could and should have been prevented. All the evidence from the Royal Commissions 
highlight that particular harms occurred with impunity within specific organisations, often 
for years at a time. These organisations can and should be regarded as criminogenic – by 
encouraging, permitting, facilitating or failing to prevent crimes. The criminal justice system 
needs to develop a realistic account of the organisation as a legal actor.  
 
This article has proposed that the UK offence of failure to prevent should be extended 
broadly to a failure to prevent breach of legal duties by organisations. The failure to prevent 
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model enshrines existing legal duties of care at the centre of organisational models to 
ensure that the responsibility of meeting these duties of care is an integral part of doing 
business. Corporate law theorists have long argued that corporations are externalising 
machines, where only certain costs and benefits are taken into account, whilst others are 
excluded.183 Criminalising corporate conduct and failures repudiates false valuations 
embodied in corporate wrongdoing, whereby harms are regarded as an unfortunate and 
unlucky side effect of doing business.184 Holding organisations responsible for the failure to 
prevent clarifies what we expect corporations to be responsible for.185 The Royal 
Commissions have highlighted that existing legal duties of care and mandatory reporting 
have not resulted in reform to corporate practices. There are difficulties associated with the 
failure to prevent offence. The failure to prevent offence does not resolve the myriad ways 
in which corporations can and do inflict harm. However, it goes some way towards 
recognising the systemic breach of legal duty by many corporations causing widescale harms 
in a way which is practical and also justifies and requires attributions of criminal 
blameworthiness. 
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